the nature of a problem and suggests potential solutions to it [Baumgartner and Jones 1991] . Policy images reflect a set of shared understandings-they define how policies are understood and discussed by the media, decision makers (e.g., members of Congress, the president), and the public. In particular, "by contriving an appropriate image of the position, prospects, problems or dangers of the state the industrial system can insure a reaction favorable to its needs" [Galbraith 1971, 328] . For much of the twentieth century, additional spending on building new health care facilities and expanding the range of services available to the public were seen in uniformly positive terms. In 1932, the final report of the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care defined the nation's health policy agenda in terms of increasing access to care to all members of the population [Stevens 1989 ]. For health providers, this endorsement reflected a societal commitment to increasing investment in health care through additional support for research, infrastructure development, and the medical profession.
The Committee's agenda was soon embraced by national policymakers, business leaders, and the public. A congruence of values among providers, policymakers, and the public is not unexpected, for "much of what is believed to be socially important is, in fact, the adaptation of social attitudes to the goal system of the technostructure. What counts here is what is believed" [Galbraith 1971, 163] . The positive policy image of health providers and of additional health care spending did not lend itself to the mobilization and organization of health care purchasers, allowing hospitals and their allies (e.g., Blue Cross plans) to dominate the reimbursement process. A solid majority of citizens endorsed the expansion of voluntary health insurance coverage; free medical care for mothers, infants, and the needy; and expansion of the Social Security system to include sickness benefits [Erskine 1975 ]. Concerns over access, not cost containment, also dominated the health policy agenda in Congress during the 1940s and l950s, as issue entrepreneurs sought to expand coverage to underserved groups and to increase the supply of physicians and hospitals.
The Politics of Accomodation: Federal Health Care Policies in the 1940s and 1950s
The federal government's early forays into health care financing were relatively innocuous from the perspective of health providers. During the 1930s, the federal Works Progress Administration constructed and renovated hundreds of hospitals nationwide. The Lanham Act, passed in 1941, provided more than $120 million to build or upgrade hospital facilities in geographic areas where defense plants and military bases were located as part of the war effort [see Stevens 1989, 208-11] . In the 1940s and 1950s, federal health policies were aimed at winning the political support of constituents and health providers, both of whom clamored for more, not less, spending on health care. Beginning in the late 1940s, the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, best known as the Hill-Burton program, provided federal funds for the construction and modernization of hospital facilities and imposed few binding restrictions on providers [Lave and Lave 1974] . Federal programs subsidized care for the indigent and poor elderly, provided health services to Indian tribes under the aegis of the Indian Health Service, and cared for veterans and military personnel through a separate system of hospitals operated by the Veterans' Administration and the respective military services [Serbein 1953 ]. At the same time, federal support for basic medical research expanded at a rapid pace under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Federal research funds were also used to purchase inpatient hospital care for indigent patients undergoing diagnostic testing for cancer, tuberculosis, and venereal disease through programs administered by the National Cancer Institute and the U.S. Public Health Service [Serbein 1953, 257-60] . None of these initiatives challenged the prerogatives or autonomy of providers-all were popular distributive programs that enjoyed widespread public and congressional support.
The Hill-Burton program was designed to increase public access to quality health care services by subsidizing hospital construction. Since the prevailing view from the 1940s through the mid-1960s was that increased access to medical care would improve the overall health of the population, federal health policies during this period increased spending on health care facilities and personnel. Although Hill-Burton was intended to target benefits to rural and underserved areas, the immense popularity of hospital construction led Congress to spread program funding throughout their districts, rather than funneling funds to poorer, rural areas. Hill-Burton made it possible for members of Congress to claim credit for worthy projects in their districts on an annual basis; during the first five years of the program, more than 1,700 separate projects were approved, adding more than 80,000 hospital beds across the nation at a cost of more than $400 million [Serbein 1953, 276-77] .
Federal support for increasing health care facilities, personnel, and research during this period reflects Galbraith's [1971, 164] observation that "successful planning in areas of expensive and sophisticated technology requires that the state underwrite costs, including the costs of research and development, and that it insure a market for the resulting products." Federal policies ensured that consumer demand for health care services would continue to rise, for unions were encouraged to bargain for health insurance and other nonwage "fringe benefits" in lieu of additional compensation during the wartime economy of the 1940s to slow inflationary pressures on wages. Private health insurance coverage expanded rapidly during the 1950s, prompting many critics of national health insurance to suggest that comprehensive federal reform was no longer needed [Hackey 1997 ]; by the mid-1950s, more than 100 million Americans were covered by private health insurance [Stevens 1971 ]. Health care financing during this period illustrates Galbraith's [1971, 299] observa-tion that "the line between public and private authority in the industrial system is indistinct, and in large measure imaginary." Over the course of a decade, hospitals succeeded in securing federal subsidies for new construction projects, lowered the cost of charity care, and increased the ability of the poor elderly to purchase their services.
The first direct federal involvement in provider reimbursement came in 1950, when Congress authorized a system of "vendor payments" to compensate health providers for free care given to persons receiving public assistance. As Rosemary Stevens notes [1989, 269] , "The advent of vendor payments, with their direct assumption of government purchase of care . . . assumed, in effect, that private charity giving to the poor-Thy hospitals and physicians-ought to be unnecessary." This assumption became the unofficial dogma within the hospital industry and was adopted by both the federal government and AHA as the proper method for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of charity care (later known as uncompensated care). The passage of the Kerr-Mills program in 1960 expanded the federal government's role in providing coverage for the poor by subsidizing medical care for the elderly through federal matching funds provided to state medical assistance programs. While neither vendor payments nor the Kerr-Mills program had an appreciable impact on the financing of health services, both legitimated federal involvement in the financing of health care.
The implementation of vendor payments and Kerr-Mills, however, raised the ire of providers over what they perceived to be inadequate reimbursement for the costs associated with furnishing charity care. In an effort to define the terms of relationships between hospitals and purchasers of health care, the AHA published its Principles for the Payment of Hospital Care in 1953. The Principles established retrospective, cost-based reimbursement as the industry's standard operating procedure and declared that hospitals should be reimbursed for the full cost of treating a patient. Under this system, which was subsequently adopted by Blue Cross plans and endorsed by both the federal vendor payments and the Kerr-Mills program, purchasers of health care had little market leverage to control either the price or the utilization of health care services.
Each of the principal federal initiatives in the two decades following the end of World War II served important purposes for providers without threatening their autonomy. Federal investment in hospital construction under the Hill-Burton program simultaneously addressed the desire of providers for additional capital investment, of physicians for more sophisticated "workshops" [Pauly and Redisch 1973] , and the public's concerns about improving access to care, particularly in the nation's poor and rural communities. The expansion of the Veterans' Administration hospital system and its close affiliation with graduate medical programs provided medical school faculty and students with a steady supply of patients on which to practice their skills. Finally, the federal government's role as a third-party payer The "adaptation of public goals to the goals of the technostructure" [Galbraith 1971 , 312] occurred throughout the implementation process, as strong provider representation on the principal advisory bodies enabled hospitals and physicians to advocate for advantageous financing arrangements. Nowhere was this pattern of accommodation more visible than in the implementation of Medicare. Provider input was solicited for all key decisions regarding reimbursement, utilization, standards of care, and the certification of physicians, hospitals, and home health providers [Feder 1977] . Veiled threats about a provider boycott of Medicare, which could potentially cripple the program and embarrass the administration, continued throughout the year-long rule-making process leading up to the program's startup. The administration's concerns about a boycott of the program were reflected in the organization of the Bureau of Hospital Insurance's (BHI) principal advisory councils-the Health Insurance Benefits Advisory Council (HIBAC) and the National Medical Review Committee (NMRC). The HIBAC mediated disputes among providers, third-party health insurers, and SSA officials and considered all issues relating to the organization, financing, and delivery of program services in the year before program startup. As one of the primary policy incubators for Medicare's rule-making process, the HIBAC afforded providers significant leverage over the implementation process, for nine of the council's sixteen members were physicians [Somers and Somers 1967, 32] . Although the membership of the NMRC had not been appointed before the program's startup, the enabling legislation mandated that a majority of the committee's nine members must be physicians and that other members should be selected from "organizations and associations of professional personnel in the field of medicine and other individuals who are outstanding in the field of medicine or related fields; except that at least one member shall be representative of the general public" [Somers and Somers 1967, 31-32] .
In this context, federal officials were reluctant to fully exercise their newfound leverage over health providers. Although Lawrence Jacobs [1992] suggests that public opinion strongly influenced the implementation of Medicare, the development of Medicare's retrospective cost-based reimbursement system using fiscal intermediaries reflects James Q. Wilson's [1980, 369] description of client politics, in which an "easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organize and lobby; the costs and benefits are distributed at a low per capita rate over a large number of people, and thus they have little incentive to organize in opposition-if indeed, they even hear of the policy."
If hospitals had lost the war over extending health insurance to the elderly in 1965 (see Marmor [1971] for an excellent account), they won the first battles over reimbursement in the years that followed. The end result was a boon for the industry. In addition to extending insurance coverage to a large segment of the population that had historically underutilized medical services, hospitals won federal reimbursement for the indirect costs of patient care such as capital expenditures and depreciation [Somers 1969 ]. Although the BHI determined eligibility and paid for Medicare subscribers' benefits, responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the program was delegated to "fiscal intermediaries," 90 percent of which were Blue Cross plans. Proponents of the concept argued that both Medicare and the hospitals would "benefit from the relationships [the intermediaries] have established with hospitals, physicians and others who furnish health care" [Feder 1977, 37] .
Utilization review audits to ensure that providers did not overcharge Medicare for unnecessary services were also conducted by intermediaries, thus linking responsibility for payment and oversight within an administrative structure dominated by health providers. Furthermore, since providers were free to contract with their choice of fiscal intermediaries to handle Medicare claims processing, a Blue Cross plan that tried to "get tough" with hospitals on issues of quality and cost containment could find itself without a contract. Without strong incentives to act otherwise, few Blue Cross plans risked the financial benefits from their status as intermediaries to do the government's dirty work; most accommodated, rather than antagonized, hospitals.
Following the practice of most Blue Cross plans, Medicare agreed to reimburse hospitals on the basis of "usual, customary and reasonable" (UCR) fees and charges within a geographic area. This mode of reimbursement was decidedly inflationary, for as the average fee level rose in an area, so did the definition of what qualified as usual, customary, and reasonable. Hospitals had no incentive to limit the growth of costs, for to do so would reduce revenues. Instead, hospitals saw Medicare as a source of funds for capital expansion and aggressively pressed for reimbursement on a 'cost-plus" basis, arguing that even nonprofit institutions needed a modest surplus over their operating expenses to provide capital for renovation, expansion, and research [Somers 1969 ]. Providers reached a compromise with federal officials that added an additional 2 percent to Medicare reimbursements to cover "other costs" associated with providing care to program beneficiaries. As a result of this compromise, Medicare pumped millions of additional dollars into hospital coffers with no strings attached, setting off a hospital construction bonanza in the late 1960s and early 1970s; Medicare's payments to hospitals grew from $891 million in 1966 to $4.7 billion in 1969.
The End of Consensus
After 1965, the policy image of health care changed as decision makers and the public came to view additional spending on health care as a "crisis" that had to be controlled, rather than as an "investment" in needed programs for underserved segments of the population. The passage of Medicare and Medicaid gave federal officials a direct interest in health care cost containment. The health care cost explosion in the years after 1965 led to fundamental changes in the relationship between public officials and providers and other societal interests. As the policy image of health care shifted, the interests of elected officials shifted as well; rising costs provided federal officials with a reason to intervene in the fiscal affairs of the hospital industry for the first time. Beginning in the late 1960s, cost-conscious federal policymakers looked to new institutions to exercise leverage over the industry, placing government increasingly at odds with the hospital industry technostructure. Initial restrictions on providers in the 1960s and 1970s were modest, but the scope of federal "rationalizing strategies" to control the rapidly rising cost of entitlement programs expanded over time. By the 1980s, the line between government at both the state and federal levels and the technostructure was increasingly clear, as public officials embraced the pursuit of hospital cost containment in a "government-led search for solutions to government's own problems" [Brown 1983, 45] . Until government officials possessed the statutory authority to exercise leverage over the fiscal affairs of hospitals, power over health care policymaking remained squarely in the hands of providers.
Robert Higgs [1987] contends that crisis, either perceived or real, is a precondition for the expansion of government authority. When policy debates are defined by the rhetoric of crisis, ideological opposition to the use of public authority breaks down as the public becomes anxious for government to "do something" to cope with the crisis. The rhetoric of crisis has been a common feature in health care policymaking over the past three decades. As policymakers, the mass public, and the media trumpeted the system's ills, opportunities arose for resourceful policy entrepreneurs to assemble coalitions in support of expanding public authority over the hospital industry.
As Congress began to view health care expenditures as budget busters, rather than as investments, legislators approved a variety of cost-control experiments in an effort to limit rising entitlement spending. To do so, Congress created new institutional structures, centralized decision-making authority over hospital reimbursement and capital investment, and invested state and federal regulatory agencies with new statutory mandates and policy tools to increase their leverage over health providers and third-party payers. Since countervailing power was effectively absent from health care financing, the federal government used its growing market share to reshape the health care market in the 1970s and 1980s. Federal policies toward health care financing in the years since 1965 can be seen as a series of attempts to cope with the compromises made during the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid [Brown 1983 
The Prospects and Pitfalls of Price Regulation
Even before the passage of the Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974, Congress began to experiment with other institutional levers to control health care costs. While health planning programs garnered the lion's share of attention during the 1970s, federal officials were quietly reshaping the mechanisms used to pay health providers. Health care financing reforms over the past two decades emerged from a set of arrangements aptly described by Lawrence Brown [1985] as a process of "technocratic corporatism" in which payers, providers, and government bureaucrats bargained over technical modifications to the payment system. In retrospect, Clark Havighurst's [1986] assertion that decision making in health care would increasingly devolve to the consumers of health services proved to be correct, but in an unexpected fashion. Far from the decentralized market system driven by individual choice that was envisioned by supporters of procompetitive reform, power devolved into the hands of the largest "consumers"-federal and state governments. The result was a "refederalization" of health care decision making, rather than the decentralization anticipated by conservatives [Rabe 1987 ].
The federal government's first efforts to limit its financial exposure were aimed at undoing some of the excesses that accompanied the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid. The first target of federal cost-cutters was the 2 percent "plus factor" granted to providers to provide working capital for facilities improvements and new services. While repeal of the plus factor in 1969 irked providers, it did nothing to change the fundamental design of the Medicare payment system. The first substantial change in Medicare's relationship with health providers did not come until the The cap's effectiveness was limited, for the system remained primarily retrospective and cost-based; Section 223 was intended to provide high-cost "outlier" institutions with an incentive to hold down costs. Hospitals whose charges did not deviate significantly from their peer group mean were largely unaffected by these changes. Despite its limited scope, Section 223 marked a radical departure from past policy-for the first time, the federal government placed a prospective cap on hospital reimbursement, which affected a significant percentage of the institutional caseload. Section 1122 of the Social Security Amendments also strengthened the hand of state and local planning agencies by prohibiting the use of federal funds to reimburse the capital expenditures of providers for "unnecessary" projects that had not received prior approval from state planning agencies. Although relatively few institutions were adversely affected by these changes, Pub. L. 92-603's limits on allowable costs and its restrictions on capital-expenditure reimbursement represented a fundamental break from the principles of cost-based reimbursement developed by the industry over the previous two decades.
The Social Security Amendments of 1972 also produced another significant reform that would have widespread ramifications for the regulation of the hospital industry over the next decade. While the provisions of Section 223 were aimed at outlier hospitals whose costs far exceeded national peer-group averages, Section 222 of the 1972 act authorized the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to fund demonstration projects and experiments to test various cost-containment measures that would apply to all hospitals in a geographic area. Under the terms of the demonstration projects, HEW agreed to absorb any losses it might incur if the experiments failed to achieve their cost-control targets and actual costs proved to be higher than under HEW's own reimbursement methodology. In the long run, Section 222 had a tremendous impact on health care regulation and reimbursement policies, for it encouraged the proliferation of state rate-setting experiments during the 1970s and early 1980s.
State-level experimentation redefined the relationships between payers, providers, and government regulatory agencies, particularly in states where all hospital revenues were subject to control by state regulatory agencies [Hackey 1998 ]. All payer rate-setting programs achieved considerable cost savings and limited the abil-ity of hospitals to shift costs from regulated payers (usually state Medicaid programs) to unregulated commercial insurers and paying patients [Coelen et al. 1988 TEFRA signaled the federal government's new willingness to use the rate of reimbursement as a lever to bring hospital costs under control. The growing burden of the Medicare and Medicaid programs led federal officials to pursue cost containment, despite howls of protest from the hospital industry and health providers. The rationalizing politics of cost containment underscored a growing divergence in the political interests of federal policymakers and the health care technostructure. Beginning in 1982, for the first time, a significant fraction of hospitals' revenues were determined on a prospective, rather than a retrospective, basis. The switch to prospective reimbursement was significant from a state-building perspective, for the adoption of a prospective payment system shifted control over hospital reimbursement from providers to the Health Care Financing Administration. Under the new system, federal bureaucrats, not hospital administrators, set reimbursement rates for all inpatient hospital services.
The TEFRA limits were viewed as a threat by the hospital industry because Medicare's new formula paid for hospital services largely on the basis of institutions' average costs. The federal government's new approach to hospital reimbursement led to the political fragmentation of the hospital industry, for while all hospitals benefited from the cost-based, retrospective system of reimbursement, some institutions fared well under prospective payment, while others struggled. As long as providers could earn additional revenues by passing along higher costs to the federal government, few incentives existed for institutions to reorganize their delivery of care. By setting a national average payment rate and adjusting payments to providers to account for differences in their patients' severity of illness, TEFRA pitted the interests of urban teaching hospitals and trauma centers, which treated sicker than average patients, against many of their suburban and for-profit counterparts. Under TEFRA and its successor, a hospital's profitability was closely tied to its ability to keep costs below the pre-established rate of payment. To do so, hospitals treated a growing proportion of their patients on an "outpatient" basis to limit the use of resources, cut staffing, and sought to squeeze out additional economies in purchasing and "discharge planning" to minimize patients' length of stay [Iglehart 1993 ].
Ballooning deficits contributed to the new rhetoric of crisis and legitimated policy choices that had been politically infeasible five years earlier. Commitment to cost control was a bipartisan matter in the 1970s and 1980s, as the most sweeping price regulations to date in the health sector were introduced in 1982 and 1983 at the behest of a conservative Republican president who had campaigned on a platform of reducing government regulation and intervention in the private sector. TEFRA was a radical departure from past practice, which placed many hospitals that treated a sicker than average (i.e., high-cost) patient population at a considerable disadvantage. TEFRA did not represent a temporary inconvenience for health providers, as Pub. L. 97-248 directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to recommend to Congress a more permanent prospective reimbursement system for inpatient care under Medicare by 1983.
HHS had relatively few options to choose from in suggesting a comprehensive reform of Medicare's hospital payment policies. The one option that had been widely discussed within the department, however, was New Jersey's ongoing allpayer rate-setting experiment using DRGs. HCFA had pressed New Jersey officials to adopt a DRG-based system in the late 1970s to explore the feasibility of a casebased prospective payment system for inpatient hospital care [Morone and Dunham 1985] . Given its limited time frame and the absence of other viable options, HHS recommended in its December 1982 report to Congress that Medicare phase in a prospective reimbursement system modeled after the HCFA demonstration project in New Jersey. Medicare's new (PPS) was passed as part of the 1983 Social Security Amendments (Pub. L. 98-2 1) amid little debate after a brief four-month gestation period in Congress. The passage of Medicare's PPS followed a familiar pattern, as the hospital industry technostructure endorsed the plan and worked with key congressional leaders and administration officials to develop the new DRGbased payment system. Like the previous reforms of the nation's health care financing system during the 1970s, PPS emerged out of a relatively closed, "technocratic" bargaining process that received little attention from the media or the mass public [Brown 1985] .
A Fraying AUliance between Hospitals and the Federal Government
Hospital industry representatives welcomed the change from the crude and restrictive payment criteria provided under TEFRA, for PPS's treatment of case-mix differences among hospitals represented a significant advance over the previous methodology; the proposal won the endorsement of the AHA and the Federation of American Hospitals. PPS payment rates were initially set at a high level to allay provider fears of fiscal catastrophe under the new system. Indeed, the Medicare margins (i.e., net operating profits) for all hospitals exceeded 14 percent during the program's first two years, as Medicare payments per hospital discharge increased by 18.6 percent in FY1985 and 10.5 percent in FY1986 [Altman 1995 ]. Generous reimbursement rates in the first three years of PPS led to record profits in the hospital industry, as the net operating margin for Medicare patients exceeded 10 percent [Russell 1989 ] and total revenue margins for community hospitals exceeded 5 percent from 1984 to 1986. The rising tide lifted all boats, for hospitals in all ownership categories reported positive Medicare margins in FY1985 and FY1986 [Altman 1995] . During the three-year transition period from TEFRA to PPS, Medicare agreed to use regional, rather than national, averages to determine hospital costs to ease the adjustment for hospitals located in regions with above-average costs as a result of chronic labor shortages. Under this system of "blended" rates, the proportion of the prospective rate that was based on a hospital's historical costs declined over time as the share of the rate determined by national average rates increased.
Over time, however, HCFA's accommodative policy toward the hospital industry became increasingly restrictive. Medicare margins began to decline in 1986 and fell steadily until 1993. Adjustments to PPS rates fell from double digits in the program's first two years to 3.3 percent in FY1987 and lagged behind the overall rate of medical inflation for the remainder of the decade [Altman 1995] . In retrospect, the generous rates of payment under PPS designed to reassure providers that the new payment system would remain "budget neutral" in its first years seem insignificant, for Medicare reaped considerable savings under the new system as hospitals changed their behavior to conform to the incentives of a case-based reimbursement system: admissions declined, as did the average length of stay for patients [Russell 1989 ]. As HCFA officials began to tighten the financial screws on inpatient reimbursement during the shift from individual historical costs to lower national and regional rates, PPS operating margins for hospitals fell precipitously; by 1990, most hospitals were losing money on Medicare patients [ Under PPS, a hospital's fiscal health depended on both its case mix (i.e., the severity of patients' illnesses) and its payer mix (i.e., the percentage of hospital revenues generated by different third-party insurers). Institutions serving predominantly poor inner-city communities were increasingly hard pressed to make ends meet by the end of the decade, despite Medicare's efforts to compensate institutions that treated a "disproportionate share" of indigent patients. Since these institutions typically had fewer patients with private health insurance plans that still paid on the basis of charges, many inner-city hospitals found it difficult to emulate the costshifting behavior of their suburban counterparts, in which privately insured patients were charged higher rates than those covered by Medicare or Medicaid (see Abraham [1993] for an excellent account of the difficulties facing such institutions).
PPS fundamentally changed the financial incentives for hospital reimbursement. Under the cost-based system in effect from 1966 to 1982, hospitals sought to keep patients in the hospital for as long as possible, for longer stays and additional clinical interventions increased revenues. Medicare's PPS contributed to the restructuring of the hospital industry, as the number of hospital beds, inpatient admissions, inpatient days, length of stay, and average occupancy rates fell during the 1980s, as hospitals scrambled to transfer patients to more profitable "outpatient" settings. Hospitals also acquired a financial incentive to discipline physicians who "wasted resources" by keeping patients in the hospital too long, for additional services represented either lost profits or an operating loss [Iglehart 1993 ]. Institutions soon adapted to the new payment system, leading to rising revenue margins for community hospitals in the late 1980s and early 1990s despite the fact that annual increases in Medicare payments per hospital discharge fell from 6.6 percent in FY1990 to 3.5 percent in FY1994 [Altman 1995] . Hospitals employed small armies of professional coders whose sole task was to determine the most appropriate and most profitable DRG for each Medicare patient admitted or treated. The use of creative DRG cod-ing to inflate hospital revenues (known as "upcoding" or "DRG creep") added an entire consulting industry to the health care technostructure to enable hospitals to "enhance" their Medicare revenues.
Conclusion
As Galbraith [1956, 136] argues, "The support of countervailing power has become in modem times perhaps the major domestic peacetime function of the federal government." Until the creation of large federal entitlements to provide health care for the elderly and low-income residents in the 1960s, however, congressional policymakers had few incentives to intervene in the internal affairs of the hospital industry. By the early 1970s, the growing cost of government-sponsored health insurance led to the development of new federal policies aimed at restructuring the incentives of the reimbursement process. The transformation in the role of the state in financing health care was accompanied by new institutional developments designed to enhance its control over hospital payment decisions. As Bruce Vladeck [1981, 215] argues, this was inevitable, for "extensive regulation of health care providers is the price we pay for not having national health insurance."
The evolution of health care financing policy illustrates a larger point about the effectiveness of countervailing power, for the growth of federal intervention was unable either to solve the government's own fiscal crisis or to stem the long-term trend toward increased health care spending. While TEFRA and PPS reduced the use of inpatient hospital services, hospitals adapted to the new fiscal climate by shifting patients to more profitable outpatient settings or to home care, which continued to operate on a cost-based, fee-for-service basis. The federal government's shift from passive accommodation of providers' interests in the 1950s and 1960s to the use of centralized behavioral controls in the 1980s led hospitals to reinvent themselves, for Medicare accounted for more than 40 percent of the average community hospital's gross patient revenues [Iglehart 1993 ]. The policy changes in Medicare reimbursement, which began in the early 1970s, created a "ratchet effect" [see Higgs 1987] as the Medicare program's growing share of the federal budget and its central role in preserving the balanced budget agreement led to a steady escalation of federal influence over the hospital industry. The failure of early government cost-containment initiatives led to calls for more sweeping government controls-further cutbacks in provider payments were a cornerstone of the 1997 balanced budget agreement between the Clinton administration and the Republican congressional leadership.
Although the federal government's relationship with the hospital industry resembled the "close fusion" between the state and the technostructure described by Galbraith [1971] at mid-century, over the past two decades the interests of federal policymakers and industry representatives diverged. From the 1940s through the 1960s, "members of the technostructure work[ed] closely with their public counterparts . . . in advising them of their needs" [Galbraith 1971, 395] . By the early 1970s, however, the health care technostructure faced an increasingly autonomous state whose needs had changed. New policies, in short, had produced a new style of politics [Brown 1983 ], as the federally subsidized cost explosion in the health care industry led to the development of a new policy image that placed cost containment, not improved access, at the top of the nation's health policy agenda. Hospitals had won the battle over national health insurance in earlier decades, but in the long run, incremental changes in health care financing steadily eroded the industry's fiscal and managerial autonomy.
